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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court decided the Steelworkers'
Trilogy,1 binding arbitration has become a mainstay in American labor
relations. Not only has the arbitration process been extremely successful
for both management and labor unions, but it has also limited the
burgeoning caseload in federal courts.
However, since the advent of the Steelworkers' Trilogy, numerous labor
issues still remain unresolved. One such issue is the question of whether
federal courts can enforce labor arbitration awards prospectively.
Unions most often seek prospective enforcement. By giving up the right
to strike in favor of arbitration, unions have relinquished a primary and
powerful economic weapon. Management has discovered that it is possible
to "flood" the grievance process by repeatedly violating a collective
bargaining agreement and denying grievances at each stage of the grievance
procedure, thereby forcing unions to arbitrate. The result is that repeated
arbitration over nearly identical grievances is likely to cause severe financial
hardship for financially weaker unions. In some instances the employer is
able to bring about a de facto change in the parties' contract, especially
when the union has given up its right to strike.
Moreover, since employers are able to factor in arbitration as a
production cost, the relative economic hardship suffered by an employer, as
compared to a particular union, is quite small. In contrast, the union, in
order to stay solvent, is forced to be more selective in deciding which
employee grievances should be arbitrated. This pressure is especially strong
when the employer's violations of the collective bargaining agreement are
identical except for the identity of the grievant and the date on which the
violation occurred.
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1 The Steelworkers' Trilogy consists of three cases: United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
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enforcement of labor arbitration awards. The standards for prospectively
enforcing labor arbitration awards, however, have developed in a
haphazard, common-law fashion because the United States Supreme Court
has never definitively ruled on this particular issue. The result has been a
wide range of judicial standards among the various federal circuits.
The purpose of this Article is to propose a practical and uniform
standard to be used by the federal courts in determining whether a particular
cause of action warrants prospective enforcement. By developing a new test,
prospective enforcement will become an effective remedy for both
employers and unions. Through prospective enforcement, violations of the
collective bargaining agreement will be determined by contract
interpretation rather than a method that weakens unions economically so
that they cannot afford to dispute a contract through arbitration.
Following this introduction, the second section of this Article sets out
the U.S. Supreme Court's principles and policy rationales developed in the
Steelworkers' Trilogy-and other cases. These cases provide both a context
and foundation for modem labor relations, arbitration and judicial review.
The third section analyzes the major prospective enforcement cases and
tests articulated and ultimately adopted in various federal circuit courts.
The fourth section examines both prospective injunctions and the
federal courts' treatment of same. This section draws heavily from the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Boys' Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union,
Local 7702 and lays the groundwork for establishing a uniform test for
prospective enforcement of arbitration awards. This test is fully developed
in the fifth and final section of this Article.
II. LABOR POLICIES PROMULGATED BY THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
The purpose of this section is to briefly outline some of the
foundational labor relations policies established by the Supreme Court.
While not all-inclusive, this summary will provide a frame of reference for
the reader, because many of these policies are frequently referred to
throughout the remainder of the text.
In the Steelworkers' Trilogy, the U.S. Supreme Court outlined the
basic framework of modem labor relations by defining and clarifying the
role of the courts, the arbitrators, and the appropriate relationship between
the union and the employer. 3
In deciding the Steelworkers' Trilogy, the Supreme Court recognized a
2 398 U.S. 235 (1970), overruled in part by Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,
428 U.S. 397 (1976).
3 See cases cited supra note 1.
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labor policy favoring arbitration. In this regard the Court stated:
In our role of developing a meaningful body of law to govern the
interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, we
think special heed should be given to the context in which collective
bargaining agreements are negotiated and the purpose which they are
intended to serve. The function of the court is very limited when the
parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to
[an] arbitrator.4
The Court further recognized that the scope of judicial review of
arbitration awards is very limited. The federal courts may only ascertain
whether the party seeking arbitration has made a claim that on its face is
governed by the contract. 5 In this regard the Supreme Court held:
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the
grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or
determining whether there is particular language in the [collective
bargaining agreement] which will support the claim. The agreement is to
submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will
deem meritorious.
6
The Court noted, "[i]n the context of the plant or industry the grievance may
assume proportions of which judges are ignorant.-7 The Court also recognized
that the judiciary often lacks expertise in resolving labor disputes:
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in
his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his
personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed
in the contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his
judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract
says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such
factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its
consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will
be heightened or diminished.... The ablest judge cannot be expected to
bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination
4 American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68 (citation omitted).
5 id. at 568.6 1,d. (footnote omitted).
7 Id. at 567.
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of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed. 8
One of the most important concepts recognized by the Supreme Court is
the therapeutic value of arbitration. On this point the Court stated, "The
processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which
those who are not a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware." 9
Finally, in a non-trilogy case, Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition
Community Org.,10 the Supreme Court held that it would not expect the
courts to refrain from redressing those situations when an employer
continually violates the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
Specifically, the Court held that "[o]ne would hardly expect an employer to
continue in effect an employment practice that routinely results in adverse
arbitral decisions." 11
Although the foregoing is a brief summary of the policies regarding
arbitration and the role of the federal courts, these policies should be kept in
mind throughout the remainder of this Article.
III. MAJOR FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT HOLDINGS REGARDING
THE PROSPECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR ARBITRATION AWARDS
The following section discusses the various tests formulated by the
federal appellate and circuit courts in determining whether an arbitration
award should be prospectively enforced. Each circuit is discussed in
numerical order for the convenience of the reader. Further, the following is
not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of every case in every circuit
but rather an overview of the substantive tests developed that address the
prospective enforcement issue.
A. The First Circuit and "Material Factual Identity"
In Boston Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 12 the
issue before the arbitrator was whether a certain section of a shipping
facility included a shipping berth utilized by the employer and if so,
whether the manning requirements for the shipping berth were maintained.
Because the parties' old collective bargaining agreement had expired before
the award was rendered, the union refused to abide by the award, claiming
8 Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582.
9 American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568 (footnote omitted).
10 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
11 Id. at 67 (footnote omitted).
12 659 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1981).
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it did not apply under the parties' then-current agreement.1 3 The employer
subsequently petitioned the district court for enforcement. 
14
At trial, the district court enforced the award and further held that the
award had a "mandatory precedential effect" throughout the parties'
collective bargaining term.15 The union appealed the order on the ground
that the district court order created a non-arbitrable contractual provision for
the remainder of the contract term. 
16
In partially reversing the district court's opinion, the Court of Appeals
emphasized that "the federal courts play an extremely limited role in labor
arbitration. "17 Moreover, the court held that if enforcement of an arbitration
award also requires interpretation, then the proper course of conduct would
be to remand to arbitration. 18
However, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district
court's order to the extent that it enforced or "confirmed" the award.19 The
appellate court also held that the arbitration award would have a'prospective
effect. 20 The court reasoned that the arbitration award should be affirmed
absent any "material change" in circumstances. 2 1 Because the only
"material change" was the fact that the parties had entered into a new
collective bargaining agreement, the court held there was no reason to
prospectively enforce the prior award. In this regard the court stated:
[I]f it is beyond argument that there is no material factual difference
between the new dispute and the one decided in the prior arbitration that
would justify an arbitrator's reaching a different conclusion, the new
dispute is a "like" dispute subject to enforcement under the prior
award.... Under this approach, if there is an arguable material
difference, the dispute is for the arbitrator; if not, the parties are bound by
their prior arbitration. 22
The threshold issue in Boston Shipping concerned the physical
boundaries of the shipping facility and the location of the shipping berth
13 Boston Shipping, 659 F.2d at 2.
14 Id
.
15 Id.
16 id
.
17 Id.
18 Boston Shipping, 659 F.2d at 3.
'
9 1d. at5.
20 Id.
21 Id.
2 2 1d. at4.
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therein. Because the shipping berth was either included or excluded from
the scope of the employer's operations (and assuming the boundaries of the
facility would not change), any subsequent dispute between the parties
would have been identical.
Obviously then, the primary question left open in Boston Shipping is
what constitutes a "material factual difference" sufficient to deny
prospective information. 23 This question was resolved to some extent in
Derwin v. General Dynamics Corp.24 In Derwin, the union sought to simply
confirm (as opposed to prospectively enforce) an arbitration award that
authorized the issuance of off-the-job passes to union stewards. 25 Although
a prior arbitration award had been rendered directing the employer to issue
such passes, the union alleged there had been subsequent violations. 26
In deciding to issue its confirmation, the court held that it was
essentially being asked to put its "imprimatur on an arbitration award in a
vacuum."27 The court's primary fear was that without a "colorable basis"
for confirming the award and no "material factual identity" (as stated in
Boston Shipping) between the dispute at arbitration and subsequent
violations, a precedent would be established whereby one party was given
leverage over the other in contract negotiations or future arbitrations. 28
In addition, the court feared that by merely "confirming" the award,
such action could lead to a bifurcated approach whereby the court would be
asked to "enforce" the award at a later date. On this point the court stated:
[We question the need for or wisdom of this bifurcated approach. It
seems to us cumbersome, unnecessary, and potentially misleading -
especially as an order of confirmation issued in a factual vacuum may
result in unpredictable pressure and aspersions upon the party against
whom the order runs. Entry of a declaration "confirming" the award may
be taken to imply that the defendant is in fact violating it. Courts, after all,
do not enjoin parties from violating the law without proof of a real
likelihood that such will happen. At very least, it is hard to fathom what
the present debate over confirmation portends. Both parties profess to
agree that the Stutz award is binding. A decree confirming it at this time
will merely give the parties something more to argue about. 29
23 Boston Shipping, 659 F.2d at 4.
24 719 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1983).
2 5 Id. at 486.
26 id.
27 Id. at 49 1.
28 See id. at 492.
29 Derwin, 719 F.2d at 491-92.
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Given the facts of the case, the Derwin court's decision is sound. By
refusing to become entangled in distinctions of confirmation or enforcement
of a prior arbitration award, the court was able to avoid acting as a "super-
arbitrator" in the parties' dispute. More importantly, the court was able to
set forth a clearer test of when an arbitration award will be prospectively
enforced. In this regard the court stated:
Only where an arbitrable award is both clearly intended to have a
prospective effect and there is no colorable basis for denying the
applicability of the existing award to a dispute at hand, will a court order
compliance with the award rather than require the parties to proceed anew
through the contract grievance procedure.... As we recently said [in
Boston Shipping], unless "it is beyond argument that there is no material
factual difference between the new dispute and the one decided in the
prior arbitration that would justify an arbitrator's [sic] reaching a different
conclusion," the case must go to fresh arbitration rather than to the court
for judicial enforcement. 30
The Derwin court's "material factual identity" test is significant for two
reasons. First, the Derwin test was extended to incidents rather than limited
to identical boundary disputes as in Boston Shipping. Consequently, some
factual deviation in subsequent disputes still qualifies for prospective
enforcement. Second, the Derwin decision creates a smaller target that the
plaintiff must hit in order to bring a successful claim. The prior award must
not only be materially factually identical, it must also be issued
prospectively. By refusing to enforce or confirm arbitration awards that are
not given a prospective effect, the court avoids the problem of acting as a
"super-arbitrator" and reinterpreting the initial arbitration award.
At the same time, however, the "material factual identity" test is not
without its problems. The Derwin court's test is fraught with ambiguity.
There is no definition of what constitutes a "colorable basis" for
determining the applicability of a prior award, nor is there any definition of
what constitutes a "material factual difference" between a new dispute and
one formerly arbitrated.
In clarifying this terminology, the effect of the "material factual
identity" test is unclear. The First Circuit will either be swamped with
claims for prospective enforcement, or the parties will be reluctant to seek
prospective enforcement, given Derwin's small target and the expense of
litigation.
One of the practical implications of the "material factual identity" test
30 Derwin, 719 F.2d at 491 (citations omitted).
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is that it limits the likelihood that a union will seek prospective
enforcement. If one assumes that most parties will adhere to the decision of
an arbitration award, then it is unlikely that either party will violate the
contract on precisely the same facts. If, however, the facts of subsequent
disputes vary slightly from the prior awards, but the principles stated in the
prior awards are substantially the same, then the parties will probably
proceed to arbitration rather than seek prospective enforcement. While this
may be viewed as a benefit by encouraging the parties to seek arbitration, it
subjects the union to the expense of continual arbitration if the same
contract clause is repeatedly violated in different employment contexts.
In addition, the test also puts the burden of awarding prospective relief
on the arbitrator. If either a union or the company seeks prospective relief
in an arbitral dispute, then the question is raised as to whether the arbitrator
has jurisdiction to render such an award. Because the arbitrator is limited to
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, a plausible argument can
be made that the arbitrator could exceed the scope of his authority by
issuing an award that would extend to a future contract or dispute that does
not yet exist.
B. The Third Circuit and "Positive Assurance"
In United Mine Workers, District 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co.,31 the
union sought to enforce a settlement agreement with the company whereby
the company would agree to remove a subcontractor from one of its
preparation plants and reassign the work to classified union employees. In
Consolidation Coal Co., the court stated:
Federal courts are bound to exercise the utmost restraint to avoid
intruding on the bargained-for method of dispute resolution and when
enforcement of an arbitration award ... is sought under Section 301 [of
the Labor Management Relations Act], the court must be able to say "with
positive assurance" that the award ... was intended to cover the dispute.
If the court has any doubt, the parties should be returned to their
grievance procedure and arbitration, for it is an arbitrator, and not the
court, who is to decide whether the same issue has already been resolved
in an earlier proceeding. 32
The "positive assurance" test was further clarified and refined in Butler
Armco Indep. Union v. Armco Inc.33 In Butler, the union sought an
31 666 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1981).
32 Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d at 811 (footnote omitted).
33 701 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Butler].
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injunction, and the district court held that the dispute was better suited for
arbitration. 34 The Court of Appeals upheld the district court ruling, pointing
out the fine line between re-arbitration and prospective enforcement:
While the rule of deferring to arbitration is generally well-understood,
problems arise in its application to a situation in which the action by one
party in a particular matter is similar to an action that an arbitrator had
previously ruled was prohibited by the collective bargaining agreement. If
the court orders the parties to arbitrate the new matter, it runs the risk of
reading the prior decision so narrowly that it becomes almost
meaningless. On the other hand, by ruling that the prior decision controls
the case then before it, the court may be arrogating to itself the role of
contract interpreter which, under the Steelworkers' Trilogy, should be left,
at least in the first instance, to the arbitrator.
35
The court likewise cited Supreme Court authority for the positive
assurance test:
We do not believe that the union has asserted that it is seeking to enforce
their terms of a prior arbitration award or settlement agreement. In such a
situation, the standard the district court would apply in determining
whether to enforce the initial award is whether it can be said "with
positive assurance" that the award or settlement agreement is intended to
cover the current dispute.3
6
The language of the Third Circuit's "positive assurance" test is derived
from the Steelworkers' Trilogy case, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co.37 In Warrior & Gulf, the Supreme Court held that "[a]n
order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may
be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. "38
The Supreme Court's language, however, refers to arbitration clauses
and the question of whether a labor dispute is arbitrable, not whether
sufficient factual similarity between a current dispute and a prior arbitration
award exists to enforce the arbitration award prospectively.
Consequently, the Third Circuit's "positive assurance" test is
14 See 701 F.2d 253 at 254.
35 1d. at 255.
36 Id. at 256 n.1 (quoting Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d at 811).
37 363 U.S. 574.
38 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83.
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misguided in its approach and goes beyond the meaning of the Supreme
Court's language. Positive assurance may be an acceptable standard for
questions of arbitrability, but it is an extremely vague and subjective
standard to apply in cases of prospective enforcement. The reviewing court
is required to determine not only whether the dispute is covered by the
collective bargaining agreement, but also whether the prior arbitrator would
have rendered an award in favor of the party seeking prospective
enforcement. Inherent in this analysis is the requirement that the current
dispute be sufficiently factually similar to the prior award to warrant
prospective enforcement in the first place.
Another interesting variation on the "positive assurance" test arises in
the Third Circuit case of Local 103 of the Int'l Union of Elect., Radio and
Machine Workers v. RCA Corp.39 In RCA, the district court addressed the
question of whether an allegedly identical issue previously decided at
arbitration could be prospectively enforced when the collective bargaining
agreement contained a broad ban on re-arbitration of the same dispute.40 In
this case, the court of appeals held that the re-arbitration clause itself was a
subject for arbitration. Thus, the dispute could not be resolved by the
court. 41 The RCA court held:
[It is for the arbitrator to evaluate the relevance and effect of the [prior]
arbitration award and opinion; it is for him to decide whether it qualifies
"in industrial common law," through "experience developed by reason
and reason tried and tested by experience," as the "same question or
issue" presented by the immediate grievance which therefore may not "be
the subject of arbitration more than once. "42
The RCA court obviously recognized the tension between prospective
enforcement and upholding the policy of encouraging arbitration as stated in
the Steelworkers' Trilogy.43 However, the court fails to provide any real
remedy by refusing to determine the impact of the re-arbitration clause on
suits for prospective enforcement.
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of RCA is that the court could have
used the re-arbitration issue to encourage the parties to negotiate the
precedential and prospective effect of arbitration awards. In doing so, the
court would have created an effective remedy and upheld the policy of
promoting arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.
39 516 F.2d 1336 (3d Cir. 1975).
40 Id. at 1337.
41 Id. at 1341.
42 Id. at 1340-41 (footnote omitted).
43 Id. at 1339.
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Further, the RCA court would have eliminated all need for prospective
enforcement by approving the re-arbitration clause. The RCA court and
courts in the future would only have had to determine whether the
arbitrator's award "drew its essence" from the collective bargaining
agreement when the agreement contained a ban on re-arbitration of identical
disputes. By refusing to make these determinations, however, the RCA court
continued to promote many of the difficulties inherent in the Third Circuit's
"positive assurance" test.
First, the "positive assurance" standard, like the First Circuit's
"material factual identity" test, is extremely vague. More importantly,
however, the determination of prospective enforcement turns upon the
subjective determination of whether the court is "positively assured" and
suggests a standard whereby the court can prospectively enforce an award
on any grounds it finds compelling. The resulting problem is that the parties
have no indication as to whether they will be able to successfully bring or
defend a prospective enforcement claim.
The RCA court further states that if there is any doubt regarding the
interpretation of the prior arbitration award, the court must resort to
arbitration. 44 This analysis is problematic because it ignores the secondary
problem of arbitration sought merely to frustrate the union's attempt to
force the employee's compliance with the collective bargaining agreement.
All the employer needs to do is raise some basis for doubting the
interpretation of a prior award as applied to a current dispute, whatever the
doubt may be, and the parties must re-arbitrate.
This last point is demonstrated in RCA, in which the court states that
repeated arbitration will not result in a hollow formality;45 rather, repeated
arbitration encourages re-arbitration in situations where repeated violations
occur. Such a policy ignores the situation of an employer refusing to abide
by the collective bargaining agreement in good faith. Clearly, the
imprecision of the Third Circuit's language and its inherent subjectivity
make the "positive assurance" test most undesirable.
C. The Fifth Circuit and "Substantially Similar" Arbitration Awards
The most in-depth analysis of prospective enforcement of arbitration
awards is Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Ethyl Corp.46 In
Ethyl, the union brought a grievance alleging a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement when the company assigned an on-shift supervisor to
44 RCA, 516 F.2d at 1339.
41 See id. at 1341. See also Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806, 811.
46 644 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1981).
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perform classified work. 47 The parties proceeded to arbitration. In rendering
his award, the arbitrator issued a prospective remedy by "order[ing]" the
company to "'desist from violation such as that involved here.... [and to]
hereafter desist. . . from like violations.' 48 The most important aspect of
Ethyl is that the arbitrator issued his award prospectively. This allowed the
court to fully address many of the issues discussed in this Article and to
articulate one of the major difficulties with prospective enforcement:
We must ensure that the prior arbitration award is not sidestepped and the
process of arbitration thereby rendered futile, while simultaneously
guarding against actually adjudicating the merits of a grievance made
subject to arbitration by the collective bargaining agreement. Hence, we
must devise a standard which enables us to assess whether the company is
simply committing a "like violation" of the previous award, but which
stops short of forcing us to reach a decision as to whether the current use
of the supervisors actually violates [the collective bargaining
agreement] .49
From this point the Ethyl court formulated its test for enforcing an
arbitration award issued prospectively:
It seems logical that conduct which is substantially similar to the actions
condemned in the prior arbitration award must be prohibited in order to
properly enforce that award. Conduct which merely differs in form from
the actions which were the subject of the prior arbitration award cannot
serve as an excuse for instituting new arbitration proceedings.... In
summary, the test of whether the current conduct is "substantially similar"
to or, rephrased slightly, is "not materially different" from the conduct
condemned in the previous arbitration award adequately protects the union
from ... sidestepping or subver[ting] of the prior arbitration award. 50
In addition to the "substantially similar" test, the Ethyl court articulated
the appropriate evidentiary standards to be used in prospective enforcement
cases:
mhe plaintiff thus has the ultimate burden of proving that the disputed
conduct falls, beyond argument, within the prohibition and outside the
exceptions of the [collective bargaining agreement] ....
47 644 F.2d 1044 at 1047.
48 id.
49Id. at 1050.
50 id.
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If the plaintiff establishes that the current conduct inarguably falls
within the prohibition [of the collective bargaining agreement] that was the
subject of the previous arbitration award, the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate, through the presentation of evidence the reasons
why the disputed conduct at least arguably falls within an express
exception in, or is otherwise exempted from satisfying the mandates of,
the relevant article of the bargaining agreement .... If the defendant is
unable to articulate, through evidence, legitimate reasons why the disputed
conduct is even arguably exempt from the prohibition [of the collective
bargaining agreement], then the court can conclude that the present
conduct is substantially or materially similar to the company's previous
actions and thereby constitutes a "like" violation of the bargaining
agreement as condemned in the prior arbitration award. 51
Ethyl is by far the most analytical and definitive statement made by any
court to date regarding prospective enforcement. However, the Ethyl court
has still failed to address several important issues.
First, it is impossible to apply the prior arbitration award to the new
dispute while interpreting the relevant provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement. In the Steelworkers' Trilogy, the Supreme Court held
that courts are not allowed to substitute their judgment for that of the
arbitrators in determining the validity of an arbitration award. 52 In a
prospective enforcement case, the Ethyl court and courts in other circuits are
substituting the rubric of comparing fact patterns in arbitration awards for
what is essentially contract interpretation.
For example, if a particular court decides the current dispute is similar
to a prior prospective arbitration award, the unstated premise is that this
type of conduct is either protected under the collective bargaining agreement
or that the collective bargaining agreement prohibits that particular conduct.
In either case, a court implementing the "substantially similar" test is
effectively preempting arbitration by holding that the new dispute falls
within the prohibitions of the previous arbitration award. Not only is the
court indirectly interpreting the collective bargaining agreement, but the
court is substituting its judgment for that of the arbitrator's by deciding that
the prior arbitrator would reach the same result in the current dispute as in
the prior award.
51 Ethyl, 644 F.2d at 1051-52 (footnotes omitted).
52 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599
(1960).
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Finally, any court applying the "substantially similar" test would
exceed the scope of the arbitrator's authority if the prior award was not
issued prospectively, but the parties sought to bring a suit to enforce an
award prospectively on the basis of a series of similar subsequent violations.
For example, if an arbitrator issues a prospective award such as in Ethyl by
prohibiting supervisors from performing bargain unit work, it is foreseeable
that another dispute may arise involving substantially similar facts on prior
occasions subsequent to the initial award. However, if in the dispute sought
to be enforced, an arbitrator finds that the prior instances of allegedly
prohibited conduct constituted a "past practice," not expressly stated in the
parties' collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator may reach a different
result, even though the facts of the current dispute and prior award are
substantially similar. 53
53 In their treatise on arbitration, Elkouri and Elkouri state:
Arbitrators have ruled both ways on the question of whether, in the absence of
contract provisions to the contrary, management has the right to assign bargaining
unit work to employees outside the unit ... . [w]here there [is] no specific contract
restriction and management acted in good faith in assigning the work to non-unit
employees, other arbitrators have emphasized in varying degrees certain
consideration or justifying circumstances in upholding management's action.
Included among such considerations or circumstances are the following fact
situations:
1. The quantity of work of the effect on the bargaining unit is minor or de minimus in
nature.
2. The work is supervisory or managerial in nature.
3. The work assignment is a temporary one for a special purpose or need.
4. The work is not covered by the contract.
5. The work is experimental.
6. Under past practice the work has not been performed exclusively by bargaining unit
employees.
7. There is a change in the character of the work.
8. Automation or a technological change is involved. Removal of accounting, payroll,
billing, time keeping, and other clerical work from the bargaining unit upon
establishment of centralized electronic data processing programs has been upheld in
numerous cases. In one such case the arbitrator stated that "utilization of computer
technology have become very common in American business practice .... "
9. An emergency is involved.
10. Some other special situation or need is involved.
FRANK ELKOURu & EDNA A. ELKoURi, How ARBITRATION WORKS 547-48 (4th ed. 1985)
(footnotes omitted).
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But even if one assumes a reviewing court is familiar with the concept
of past practice and the circumstances in which it would apply, the court
may still decide the allegedly prohibited conduct is substantially similar to
the prior arbitrator award.
In another example, an arbitrator may find that although the current
dispute and prior award are substantially similar, a technological change in
production requires a change in employee job classifications. Consequently,
a supervisor was required to perform what was formerly bargaining unit
work. Clearly, these examples indicate that a court applying the "substantial
similarity" test can, in some instances, circumvent the arbitral process.
In addition to the foregoing, the "substantially similar" test ignores the
therapeutic value of arbitration as previously stated.4 The Steelworkers'
Trilogy acknowledged that arbitration may have benefits beyond mere
adjudicating by allowing the parties to air their grievances immediately and
thereby maintain industrial stability.55 If one accepts the premise that some
contract violations are inadvertent or due to differences of contract
interpretation, a court willing to prospectively enforce every contract
violation "substantially similar" to a prior award may ultimately frustrate
the arbitration process and promote tension between the employer and the
union. An overzealous union seeking to prospectively enforce a prior
arbitration award and forcing the employer into litigation will obviously
increase union animus. The counter-argument is that if a union suffers
repeated violations of the same arbitration award, re-arbitration will have
little therapeutic value, if any.
Another major difficulty with the "substantially similar" test stems
from the procedural posture of Ethyl. Because the prior award had already
been issued "prospectively," the Ethyl court was not forced to address the
question of whether the prior arbitration award should have been issued
prospectively. Ethyl provides no insight as to whether a prior arbitration
award would have been prospectively enforced by the court of appeals had
the arbitrator not previously ordered a prospective remedy. 56
Similarly, the First and Third Circuits have not addressed the issue of
54 See supra text accompanying note 9.
55 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
56 It is important to note that the focus of this Article is on the tests articulated for
arbitration awards that have not been issued prospectively and whether the federal courts can
enforce the same. Another reason the enforceability of prospectively issued arbitration awards
is not considered here is because such suits would in essence constitute suits to confirm
arbitration awards rather than prospectively enforce them. The only inquiry necessary for any
federal court reviewing a prospectively enforced arbitration award would be whether the
arbitrator's award "draws its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement.
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whether an arbitration award adjudicating a single dispute should be given a
prospective effect. The First Circuit in Derwin vaguely states that in the
later dispute, prospective enforcement must be given.57
In the Third Circuit, however, the "positive assurance" test seems to
require that the prior arbitration award must first be issued prospectively. 58
If the prior award is not prospective, then a court asked to prospectively
enforce the award could not say with "positive assurance" that the award
was intended to govern the asserted dispute.59
Regarding the Fifth Circuit, the language in Ethyl implies that the court
must first have some basis for enforcing an award prospectively. In Ethyl,
the court held:
An arbitrator's award which would have merely instructed Ethyl not to
use a supervisor named Johansan in the railway yard in the manner he
was used during two shifts three years earlier - an award which would
have merely reminded the company of a faded memory and proceeded to
order that the memory be forgotten forever - would have been a totally
useless remedy for the Union. In fact, the only effect of such an award
would have been to demonstrate the folly of seeking to enforce ... the
collective bargaining agreement: ... the Union would merely be provided
with the opportunity to correct a wrong in the annals of the Ethyl
Corporation. 6°
The Fifth Circuit recognized the obvious futility of an arbitration award
so specific that it fails to provide any remedial effect. In contrast, the Ethyl
court overly narrows the issue by discussing the effect of an award limited
to "supervisors named Johansan."61 The more difficult, and heretofore
unresolved, question is whether an arbitration award, which prohibits
supervisors from performing non-bargaining unit work, and is not issued
prospectively, can in fact still be prospectively enforced. Although the Fifth
Circuit leaves that issue unresolved in Ethyl, the issue is more fully
addressed by the Seventh Circuit.
57 Derwin, 719 F.2d at 491.
58 United Mine Workers of America, District 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d
806, 811 (3d Cir. 1981).
59 See id.
60 644 F.2d at 1048.
61 id.
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D. The Seventh Circuit and "Strict Factual Identity"
United Elect., Radio, and Mach. Workers v. Honeywell, Inc.62 is the
most important case in the Seventh Circuit. The most unique aspect of
Honeywell is that the prospective nature of this case is based upon the
precedent of four prior arbitration awards, as opposed to a single prior
arbitration award, being enforced prospectively.
In Honeywell, the union brought an action for violation of a collective
bargaining agreement. 63 The union's complaint alleged that four prior
arbitration awards issued in 1973 prohibited the company from assigning
classified bargaining unit work to supervisory personnel.64 The union
further claimed that the company had failed to comply with the meaning and
effect of the arbitration awards by violating the same contract provisions
formerly arbitrated in subsequent cases. 65
The union brought suit seeking the prospective enforcement of the four
arbitration awards issued in 1973. The Honeywell court recognized the
uniqueness of this type of claim for relief:
While there are numerous reported cases of parties seeking to force or
enjoin arbitration or to enforce an arbitration award, it is most unusual to
find a party seeking the right to bypass arbitration procedures which it is
contractually bound to follow and which are concededly applicable to the
particular incidents generating disputes. Although we do not foreclose the
possibility that there might exist particularly egregious circumstances
which, if alleged, might state a cause of action for relief from a
contractual duty to arbitrate, it is our opinion that the allegations of the
complaint before us are not sufficient to state such a cause of action. 66
Although the Honeywell court stated at the outset of the case that the
union would not prevail, the court continued its analysis. 67 The court first
held that in order for a union to bring a claim for prospective enforcement,
the following prerequisites must be met: (1) the union must first aggregate
its grievances in a single arbitration proceeding; (2) the union must request
declaratory or injunctive relief at arbitration; and (3) the prior arbitration
awards issued in the union's favor must be substantially identical to the
62 522 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975).
63 Id. at 1222-23.
64 Id. at 1223-24.
65 Id. at 1224.
66 Honeywell, 522 F.2d at 1225.
67 See id. at 1225-28.
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facts in those grievances which have not yet been presented for
arbitration. 68 In Honeywell, the union failed to submit any evidence that the
arbitration awards were issued prospectively or to inform the court of the
similarity of the facts to the grievances sought to be enforced. 69
Although the Honeywell court recognized the need for arbitrators to be
flexible in fashioning the appropriate remedy in labor disputes, the court
also held that similar judicial decisions, whereby the court would decide
what type of remedy would be most appropriate, were beyond the scope of
its review.70
In essence, the prospective enforcement test of Honeywell holds that in
order for the union to bring a claim for prospective enforcement, the union
must present evidence that the company is persistently and willfully
disregarding the prior arbitration awards. 71 However, even assuming the
awards were willfully and persistently violated, the union must still show
the "strict factual identity" between the prior awards and the subsequent
violations in order to receive prospective relief.72 The court's inquiry into
the prior conduct of the employer is the most important benefit of
Honeywell. By examining the parties' past relationship, the court is able to
fashion a more appropriate form of relief without intruding into the
arbitrator's domain or surreptitiously interpreting the collective bargaining
agreement. This aspect is crucial in establishing a workable prospective
enforcement test.
The Honeywell court also addressed and subsequently rejected the
notion of res judicata in the arbitral setting. The court held:
The union contends that the arbitration awards constitute interpretations of
the collective bargaining agreement with a sort of resjudicata [sic] effect
which make arbitration of the remaining grievances unnecessary. But
notions of res judicata [sic] are less suited to the informal process of
industrial arbitration than to the litigation process, and, to the extent that
resjudicata [sic] has been used in arbitration, a strict factual identity has
been required.... [l]n the instant case, the arbitration of four
subcontracting disputes in which it was determined that particular work
assignments violated the contract, does not foreclose an arbitrator's
independent application of the same contractual language to other
68 See Honeywell, 522 F.2d at 1226.
69 Id.
70 id.
71 See id. at 1228.
72 See id.
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situations. 73
The Honeywell decision is not just another variation on the prospective
enforcement theme. Numerous problems exist with the "strict factual
identity" test. Although some of the shortcomings of the "strict factual
identity" test stem from the facts of the Honeywell case, there are
conceptual problems with the test as well.
The language of the "strict factual identity" test lacks any real meaning.
The Honeywell court gives no explanation as to when a suit for prospective
enforcement is sufficiently identical to warrant enforcement of a prior
arbitration award. Without any indication as to what facts are necessary to
constitute strict factual identity, the test as articulated in Honeywell is so
vague it is meaningless.
The court of appeals in Ethyl states an additional criticism of the
Honeywell "strict factual identity" test. In this regard, the Ethyl court
commented as follows:
[R]eliance on the term "strict factual identity" to identify those grievances
which need not be submitted to arbitration has no greater appeal in logic
than the use of such terms as "semi-strict factual identity," "semi-loose
factual identity," or "loose factual identity." None of these terms serves to
identify the set of grievances which logically should be judicially enforced
from those which should be resolved by arbitration. 74
The Fifth Circuit's criticism of Honeywell is indicative not only of the
extent of disagreement among the federal circuits, but also the complexity
of the prospective enforcement issue as well. An empirical analysis of the
various prospective enforcement tests developed by the federal courts leads
to the following generalized conclusions.
First, each prospective enforcement test requires that the court broaden
its powers of judicial review by implicitly substituting its judgment for that
of the arbitrator. Stated differently, each test assumes that the arbitrator
would examine the facts in the same manner as the court and would reach
the same result in the prior arbitration award. In every circuit under every
test, if the court fails to make such an assumption, a party bringing suit for
prospective enforcement would never succeed.
In addition, this type of comparative factual analysis ignores the initial
basis for judicial review. 75 The threshold issue is limited only to whether
73 Honeywell, 522 F.2d at 1228.
74 Ethyl, 644 F.2d at 1055.
75 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
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the arbitrator's award "draws its essence" from the collective bargaining
agreement; if so, the court's judicial review is at an end. 76 By enforcing an
award prospectively, the court inevitably circumvents the arbitration process
by deciding that a current dispute is "substantially similar," "materially
factually identical" or by finding that it is "positively assured" that the
current dispute is similar to a prior dispute. Consequently, the courts exceed
their scope of authority because there is never an opportunity for the parties
to proceed to arbitration. Obviously, a court cannot determine whether the
arbitrator's award "draws its essence" from the collective bargaining
agreement because there is neither a dispute to arbitrate nor an award
rendered.
Second, each test is vague. There is no precision in the phrase
"materially factually identical," "positive assurance" or "strict factual
identity." Without accurate standards and a context in which a prospective
award could and should be applied, it is impossible for any party to bring
suit seeking prospective enforcement. If anything, the ambiguous language
will have a chilling effect on parties with valid claims for prospective
enforcement, because no specific or objective basis exists by which to
measure the merits of a particular claim.
Third, no test in any circuit distinguishes between good faith contract
violations and those violations committed in bad faith. For example, it is
conceivable that a good faith violation would occur when an employer
violates a collective bargaining agreement by breaching some provision due
to a different interpretation or misunderstanding of the contract terms. It is
equally conceivable that a bad faith violation would occur when an
employer purposely and willfully attempts to violate a collective bargaining
agreement in order to flood the grievance system, frustrate the arbitration
process or possibly reinstate some workplace practice formerly lost in the
contract negotiations.
Given these three main problem areas, a new test is needed. The
authors of this Article submit that the concept of prospective enforcement
should not be viewed as another claim brought by the parties, but rather as
an alternative remedy available only when one of the parties is violating the
contract in bad faith. In the words of Honeywell, the employer must
"willfully" and "persistently" violate the collective bargaining agreement. 77
Viewed in this manner, the concept of prospective enforcement will tend to
promote industrial stability and the use of the arbitration process, rather
than detract from it.
(1960).
76 See Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599. See also United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
77 Honeywell, 522 F.2d at 1225.
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Given the assumption that prospective enforcement should be seen as a
remedial measure for bad faith contract violations, a close analogy can be
drawn from those court decisions that have issued prospective injunctions
against labor strikes. Although a labor strike and a prospective enforced
arbitration award may appear to have little in common, an arbitration award
enforced prospectively does nothing more than prohibit future similar
violations of the collective bargaining agreement.
A permanent injunction prohibiting a labor strike, when committed in
violation of a collective bargaining agreement, does exactly the same thing
as a prospective arbitration award. The injunction protects against future
similar violations of the collective bargaining agreement.
Proceeding from this premise, the standard for issuing a permanent or
prospective injunction can be applied, with some modifications, to suits for
prospective enforcement. First, some background regarding prospective
injunctions is warranted.
IV. BACKGROUND OF PERMANENT AND PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIONS
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF BOYS MARKETS
A. Reconciling Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley
The Supreme Court's decision in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks
Union,78 was intended to reconcile the Norris-LaGuardia Act 79 and the
Labor Management Relations Act ("Taft-Hartley Act"). 10
The purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to prevent federal judges
from prohibiting strikes by ordering broad injunctions. 81 In Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,82 the Supreme Court determined that not only did
the Taft-Hartley Act authorize federal courts to fashion a substantive body
of labor law, but also that arbitration is a favored method of settling labor
disputes.
Under Lincoln Mills, the federal courts were allowed to order an
employer to arbitrate. 83 This was not considered a prohibitive injunction
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act because a refusal to arbitrate was not
78 398 U.S. 235 (1970), overruled in part by Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,
428 U.S. 397 (1976).
79 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
80 29 U.S.C. §§141-97 (1988).
81 See United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1236, 1242 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976) [hereinafter Steel 1].
82 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
83 ld. at 451.
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"part ... of the abuses against which the Act was aimed. " 84 The Supreme
Court reasoned that a union no-strike clause within the Lincoln-Mills
collective bargaining agreement was the quid pro quo for an arbitration
clause. 8 5 This quid pro quo rationale was extended in Local 174, Teamsters
v. Lucas Flour Co.,86 in which the court decided that the existence of an
arbitration clause implied a no-strike obligation over arbitrable issues.
Later, in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, the Supreme Court held that the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded a federal
district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation
under a collective bargaining agreement. 87
Subsequent to Sinclair, the Supreme Court held, in Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,88 that Section 301(a) suits
initially brought in state courts could be removed to a federal forum under
federal question jurisdiction.
The practical effect of Avco and Sinclair is to "oust state courts of
jurisdiction in Section 301 suits where injunctive relief is sought for breach
of no-strike obligation."89 The Supreme Court realized that union
defendants would be able to remove suits to federal court where it would be
more difficult for plaintiff-employers to obtain injunctive relief. The court's
decision in Boys Markets recognized that the Sinclair and Avco decisions:
(1) encroached upon state court jurisdiction, and (2) seriously offended
federal labor policy. 90
Thus, by adopting the Sinclair dissent in Boys Markets, the Supreme
Court attempted to reconcile two statutorily created federal policies: (1) the
Norris-LaGuardia prohibitions against injunctions in labor disputes, and
(2) the policy favoring the peaceful resolution of Section 301 labor disputes
through arbitration.
The reconciliation in Boys Markets amounted to a very narrow
exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Supreme Court stated:
Our holding in the present case is a narrow one. We do not undermine the
vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We deal only with the situation in
which a collective-bargaining contract contains a mandatory grievance
adjustment or arbitration procedure. Nor does it follow from what we
have said that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of course in
84 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 458.
85 Id. at 455.
86 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
87 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962), overruled in part by Boys Markets, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
88 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
89 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 244-45.
90 Id. at 245-46.
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every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance. The dissenting opinion
in Sinclair suggested the following principles for the guidance of the
district courts in determining whether to grant injunctive relief-principles
that we now adopt .... 91
The general principles of the Sinclair dissent adopted in Boys Markets
are as follows:
1) The strike is over a grievance which both parties are contractually
bound to arbitrate;
2) the company had previously demanded that the dispute be submitted to
arbitration;
3) the collective bargaining agreement contains a (no-strike) clause; and
4) the issuance of the injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury
to the plaintiff and this injury is greater than any hardship to the
defendant.92
In Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,93 the Supreme Court
clarified Boys Markets and furthered the Sinclair dissent by holding that
there is a presumption of arbitrability which is applicable to both parties in
a collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
'presumption of arbitrability' announced in the Steelworkers' Trilogy
applies to safety disputes, and that the dispute in the instant case is covered
by the arbitration clause in the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. "94
The end result of Boys Markets and Gateway is to allow federal courts
to grant injunctions against unions that have gone on strike directly in the
face of an express or implied no-strike clause in the parties' collective
bargaining agreement.
The next logical step is to determine the scope of the Boys Markets
injunction. In most instances, federal courts have enjoined union strikes and
ordered the parties to arbitrate the particular disputes in question. In other
instances, the federal courts have issued prospective and permanent
injunctions against a union on strike as well. 95
91 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253-54.
92 See id. at 254-55 (quoting Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 228 (dissenting opinion)).
93 414 U.S. 368, 377-79 (1974).
94 Id. at 379-80.
95 Note that the term "prospective" is used interchangeably with "permanent" in various
federal circuits. There is no substantive difference. In the interests of consistency and clarity,
the term "prospective" will be used in this text.
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B. Overview of Prospective Injunctions Within the Context of Boys
Markets
In order to issue any injunction, the court must first decide if the
issuance of the injunction meets the requirements as stated in Boys Markets.
Upon meeting these standards, the federal court will then consider the
availability of a prospective injunction.
While no specific requirements must be met in order to issue a
prospective injunction, the courts will generally consider (1) the number
and pattern of illegal work stoppages in the past, (2) the union's proclivity
to strike, and (3) the possibility of similar strikes in the near future.
According to Boys Markets, the rationale behind the permanent or
prospective injunction is to limit the "irreparable injury" sustained by an
employer during a union strike.96
On the other hand, the courts will also consider such factors as
vagueness, overbreadth, and lack of specificity of the injunction, as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), before issuing a
prospective injunction. Usually these factors outweigh the court's concern
regarding the union's proclivity to strike and the possibility of future union
strikes. In addition, the Court in Boys Markets concluded that the decision
to enjoin any strike must be made on a case-by-case basis.97
Further, many courts have reasoned that the strike must be over an
arbitrable issue as a condition precedent to enjoining the strike. In United
States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers,98 the court stated that "Boys
Markets contemplates a finding in each case that the strike was over an
arbitrable issue as a condition precedent to issuance of an injunction. " 99
Thus, a prospective injunction is often precluded on these grounds as well.
Keeping this brief overview in mind, the next step is to examine the
decisions, policies and rationales of the federal district and circuit courts.
96 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 250.
97 Id. at 253-54.
98 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976) [hereinafter
Steel 1].
99 Steell, 519 F.2d at 1245.
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C. Lower Court Opinions
1. Opposite Ends of the Spectrum: The Fifth and Seventh
Circuits
a. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit is one of two circuits, the other being the Tenth
Circuit, that has allowed the issuance of prospective "Boys Markets"
injunctions in labor cases. In Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, United
Mine Workers, 100 the court of appeals modified the district court's order for
a permanent injunction. The district court reasoned that Local 1487's
repetitive work stoppages warranted a prospective injunction over future
strikes.101 The appellate court modified the district court's ruling by stating:
"Were it not for the cautious approach which the existence of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act requires in this area, a broad injunction, making contempt
remedies available as to future similar instances, may well have been within
the sound discretion of the court. "102
The court went on to state that any future proclivity by the union could
result in a broader injunction: "Perhaps a broad injunction would be
appropriate in some future action should it appear that the [u]nion is
unwilling to accept the present adjudication with respect to its rights." 103
Later, in Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, United Mine Workers, 104
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit again heard an
appeal by Local 1487 from the district court's order for a permanent
injunction.
In Old Ben I, the appellate court affirmed the district court's
permanent injunction. The appellate court reasoned that the court's dicta in
Old Ben I amounted to a warning against Local 1487 not to strike. The
union argued that the warning was unclear at best and that a permanent
injunction was not warranted under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The
appellate court held to the contrary: "In Old Ben I we admonished the union
that: 'Perhaps a broad injunction would be appropriate .... 105
The court's rationale was that the Norris-LaGuardia Act allowed the
breadth of an injunction to be determined by the extent of the
100 457 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1972) [hereinafter Old Ben 1].
101 Id.
102 Old Ben 1, 457 F.2d at 165.
103 id.
104 500 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter Old Ben I].
105 Id. at 953 (emphasis added).
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misconduct. 1° 6 However, the court cites no basis in either the Norris-
LaGuardia Act or Boys Markets to support its contention.
The court also noted the irreparable injury sustained by the Old Ben
Coal Company: "Old Ben Coal has suffered heavy losses. Any remedy
therefore less than a permanent injunction is inadequate."107
The second decision within the Seventh Circuit that granted a
permanent injunction was Peabody Coal Co. v. Local 1670, United Mine
Workers.10 8 The district court determined that Peabody had suffered
irreparable injury and also that: "[J]n view of the repeated strikes in
violation of the [c]ontract, the court is of the opinion that unless a
permanent injunction is issued, such strikes will continue and that a
permanent injunction is appropriate despite the provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act." 109
The only other court to issue a permanent injunction was the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in C.F. & L Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers. 110 The court stated:
The Supreme Court's standards for judging the permissible breadth
of injunctions are found in NLRB v. Express Publishing Co.: It is there
held that:
"The breadth of the order, like the injunction of a court, must depend
upon the circumstances of each case, the purpose being to prevent
violations, the threat of which in the future is indicated because of their
similarity or relation to those unlawful acts which the Board has found to
have been committed by the employer in the past.... To justify an order
restraining other violations it must appear that they bear some
resemblance to that which the employer has committed or that danger of
their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the course of his
conduct in the past." 111
Although C.F.& L relied heavily on Express Publishing, the latter is
easily distinguished. In Express Publishing, the Supreme Court stated that
some injunctive relief is allowed in order to prevent future violations of the
106 Old Ben II, 500 F.2d at 953.
107 Id.
108 416 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. I11. 1976).
109 Id. at 495.
110 507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974).
III C.F. & 1, 507 F.2d at 174 (citiation omitted)(footnote omitted) (quoting NLRB v.
Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 436-37 (1941).
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law. 112 However, Express Publishing lends no support to a Section 301
injunction because it involves a suit by a government agency to enforce a
statutory policy. In this case, injunctive relief is expressly authorized by
statute and is not subject to the strictures of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
b. The Fifth Circuit
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the courts within the Fifth Circuit
are strongly opposed to issuing permanent injunctions. Generally, the Fifth
Circuit recognizes three prerequisites to the federal court's ability to enjoin
a strike:
In attempting to accommodate "[t]he literal terms of Section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act... to the subsequently enacted provisions of
[Section] 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act and the purposes
of arbitration," the Supreme Court in Boys Markets established three
prerequisites to jurisdiction in federal district court to enjoin a strike:
(1) the strike must be in breach of a no-strike obligation under an effective
collective agreement, (2) the strike must be "over" an arbitrable
grievance, and (3) both parties must be contractually bound [express or
implied] to arbitrate the underlying grievance which caused the strike. 113
At the same time, however, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the
narrowness of the Boys Markets exception. In Amstar Corp. v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters,114 the court stated:
The Boys Markets holding was a "narrow one," not intended to
undermine the vitality of the anti-injunction provision of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically stated that is [sic]
decision did not mean "that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of
course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance." 115
In Steel 1 116 the court echoed Amstar's rationale. The court held:
The district court's order.., was nothing less than an injunction against
112 Express Publishing, 312 U.S. at 437.
113 Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373 (5th Cir. 1972)
(footnote omitted).
114 468 F.2d 1372.
115 Id. at 1373-74 (footnote omitted).
116 519 F.2d at 1236.
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striking for the life of the contract - an order to work every day. Such
overbroad use of the injunction is the very evil Norris-LaGuardia sought
to remedy. It is not every strike which is enjoinable under Boys Markets,
nor even every strike over an arbitrable issue. 117
The Fifth Circuit underscored its reluctance to issue a prospective
injunction by maintaining that Boys Markets injunctions can only be made
on a case-by-case basis: "The carefully drawn guidelines in Boys Markets
clearly call for case-by-case adjudication. "118 In Steel I, the court reasoned
that it is impossible to issue a permanent injunction because the issue of the
dispute's arbitrability is a condition precedent to granting a permanent
injunction." 19
Courts within the Fifth Circuit are also sensitive to granting an
injunction "couched" in the terms of the agreement. 120 In Steel I, the court
stated that when a prayer for injunctive relief is as broad as the clause in the
collective bargaining agreement, it will not uphold a permanent injunction:
We have not overlooked the fact that the order was couched in the exact
words of the contract arbitration clause. Section 9 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, however, requires that a labor injunction contain "only a
prohibition of such specific act or acts as may be expressly complained of
in the bill of complaint or petition filed in such case and as shall be
expressly included in said findings of fact made and filed by the
court .... 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1970). Here, no specific act is complained
of in the motion for the amended preliminary injunction, nor prohibited in
the injunction. Such an injunction cannot stand. 121
The Fifth Circuit is also reluctant to issue a prospective injunction
because the union is subject to contempt sanctions if an additional strike
occurs. A permanent injunction provides the employer with too much
protection. If the employer refuses to arbitrate, the union is left without any
remedy to resolve the grievance.
In Steel I, a series of strikes precipitated an action by the employer for
a permanent injunction. 122 The dispute concerned mine safety, seniority,
117 519 F.2d at 1245.
118 id.
'19 Id. at 1244.
120 See id. at 1245. See also, United States Steel v. United Mine Workers, District 20,
598 F.2d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 1979); Drummond Co. v. District 20, United Mine Workers, 598
F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1979).
121 Steel 1, 519 F.2d at 1245-46 (citations omitted).
122 id.
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and the filling of job vacancies. The Steel I court held, inter alia, that: "In
this case the effect of the district court's order is a determination that any
strike would violate his order. This position forced the union to litigate the
applicability of Boys Markets in a contempt proceeding, a situation strongly
reminiscent of 'government by injunction.'" 12 3
The "contempt proceeding" rationale is reinforced by the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning that a permanent injunction is also precluded by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d):
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall
set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall
describe in reasonable detail, and not be reference to the complaint or
other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding
only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal
service or otherwise.
124
In Steel 1,125 the court adopted the Supreme Court's decision in
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine
Trade Ass'n. 126 The Steel I court stated:
[In Longshoremen's] [t]he Supreme Court reversed, relying on
Rule 65(d), because it was unclear from the [district court's prior
injunctive] order whether it applied to [the Longshoremen's]
second strike. The Court said: "The judicial contempt power is a
potent weapon. When it is founded upon a decree too vague to be
understood, it can be a deadly one. Congress responded to that
danger by requiring that a federal court frame its orders so that
those who must obey them will know what the court intends to
require and what it means to forbid." 127
Cases from other circuits have been decided on similar grounds. 128
123 Steel I, 519 F.2d at 1245-46.
124 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
125 519 F.2d 1246.
126 389 U.S. 64 (1967)[hereinafter Longshoremen's].
127 519 F.2d at 1246 (quoting Longshoremen's 389 U.S. at 76).
128 See Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 633 F.2d 302, 310 (3d
Cir. 1980); Latas Libby's, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 609 F.2d 25, 32 n.10 (Ist Cir. 1979);
United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 534 F.2d 1063, 1078 (3d Cir. 1976).
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Typically, these decisions limit an injunction to enjoining the union from
striking over the dispute in question. However, a court will occasionally
enjoin the union from striking in the future over similar disputes.
2. The Middle Ground: District Court Decisions in Various
Circuits
The most common rationale for the decision not to enforce a permanent
injunction is that a sufficient pattern of strikes that will justify the issuance
of an injunction has not been shown.
This reasoning was adopted by the Third Circuit in Bituminous Coal
Operators' Ass'n v. United Mine Workers.129 The court stated: "Section 9
and Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the
injunction be limited to the likely recurrence of violations of the same
nature as those which already have been adjudicated." 130 This reasoning
was echoed by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York: "[A]ny prospective injunction must be confined to the same types of
violations of the no-strike pledge that have occurred in the past and are
likely to occur in the future."' 3 '
In United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers,132 the court
stated: "[W]e agree with the district court that in a Section 301 suit a
federal court may enjoin prospectively a pattern of contract violations, but
we hold that in this instance the injunction was both overbroad and
insufficiently specific." 133
The second reason for not enforcing a permanent injunction is that the
scope of the injunction is vague and oversteps the limitations of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Various courts reasoned that a prospective injunction should
not be issued since the courts are unable to prospectively anticipate the
nature of the underlying dispute causing the strike. Without knowing what a
future dispute may concern, the courts find it inherently unjust to enjoin a
union from striking in the future.134
129 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978).
130 Id. at 599.
131 Dannon Co. v. Whelan, 555 F. Supp. 361, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
132 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976) [hereinafter Steel fl].
133 Id. at 1078. See also, United Parcel Service (New York) v. Local 804, Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 698 F.2d 100, 110 (2d Cir. 1983); Drummond Co. v. District 20,
United Mine Workers, 598 F.2d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 1979); Donovan Constr. Co. of
Minnesota v. Construction, Prod. & Maintenance Laborers Union Local 383, 533 F.2d 481,
488 (9th Cir. 1976).
134 See, e.g., United Parcel Service, 698 F.2d 100; United States v. Pittsburgh Trade
Exchange, Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981); Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n. v. United
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In Donovan Constr. Co. of Minnesota v. Construction, Prod. &
Maintenance Laborers Local 383,135 the court stated:
If the scope of the injunction is so broad as to enjoin union activity in
situations that the court could not have found to be suitable for Boys
Markets relief, because of the paucity of factual support for the necessary
findings, the injunction crosses the jurisdictional boundary of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. We believe that the injunction here crossed that
boundary. 136
Some of the courts buttress their decisions with similar reasoning
adopted from the Fifth Circuit. One such case is Steel 11. 137 In regard to the
strictures of Rule 65(d), the court stated:
We believe that Rule 65(d) requires that something more be done in this
case.... It seems to us that any prospective injunctive decree must tell
the local what specific steps it must take to prevent illegal work stoppages
from recurring and must tell the parent organization what prophylactic
steps it must take to assure that the local fulfills its contractual
obligation. 138
The Steel I court also noted the disadvantage of a union being placed
in a contempt situation if the court were to issue an injunction as broad as
the arbitration clause itself: "A blanket injunction in the language of the
arbitration clause places in the hands of the successful Section 301 plaintiff
a weapon by which harassment by contempt citations may take the place of
the normal ongoing collective bargaining process. No Section 301 defendant
should be subjected to that risk." 139
Finally, the court in Latas Libby's, Inc. v. United Steel Workers140
echoed a similar sentiment:
The harassment value to a successful plaintiff of an injunction such
as the one issued by the district court below is considerable. The
Mine Workers, 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978); Steel II, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976); New
York Tel. v. Communications Workers, 445 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1971).
135 533 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1976).
13 6 Id. at 485-86.
137 534 F.2d 1063.
138 Steel II, 534 F.2d at 1077-78.
139 Id. at 1078.
140 609 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1979).
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union should not be placed in a position of having to defend
against contempt sanctions as a result of any strike against the
[c]ompany in the future, under this or subsequent agreements. 141
Clearly, the foregoing represents a broad spectrum of judicial decisions
regarding prospective injunctions. However, it is possible to discern several
common themes among seemingly individual cases and incorporate these
themes into a generalized prospective injunction test. It is from this
prospective injunction test that the prospective enforcement test is ultimately
derived.
V. A SOLUTION TO THE PROSPECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF PRIOR
ARBITRATION AWARDS BASED UPON THE PROSPECTIVE
INJUNCTION MODEL
A. Similarities Between Prospective Injunctions and Prospective
Enforcement of Arbitration Awards
In summary, federal courts are very reluctant to issue either permanent
or prospective injunctions against a striking union. As stated previously, the
courts will decline to issue a permanent injunction based upon one or more
of the following grounds:
1) The lack of specificity in the injunction as required by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 65(d);
2) The employer's failure to show irreparable injury or a specific
pattern of prohibited strike activity;
3) An injunction order that is vague, overbroad, or oversteps the
boundaries of a Boys Markets injunction;
4) When the issuance of a prospective injunction would place the
defendant union in a contempt situation;
5) When the issuance of an injunction would fail to preserve labor
dispute arbitration and adjudication on a case-by-case basis.
Once a court is satisfied that a Boys Markets injunction should be
issued, a prospective injunction will be issued when:
1) Several prohibited labor strikes or work stoppages or both have
occurred;
2) The illegal work stoppages or prohibited strikes, or both, have a
similar pattern or basis in fact;
3) The union has demonstrated a proclivity to strike;
4) There is a likelihood of similar strikes in the near future.
141 609 F.2d at 32 n.10.
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The authors of this Article submit that not only is it possible to develop
a uniform standard for the prospective enforcement of arbitration awards,
but also that such a standard should be seen as a counterbalance to a
prospective enforcement of arbitration awards. In addition, such a standard
should be considered a fairly severe remedy similar to that of the
prospective injunction. As stated in United Elect. Radio and Mach. Workers
v. Honeywell,142 prospective enforcement should only be used in those
situations in which there is labor hostility, and the arbitration mechanism is
not being used in good faith. 143
There are striking similarities between suits for prospective
enforcement and suits brought seeking prospective injunctions. First, the
rationales employed by courts such as the Fifth Circuit in refusing to issue
prospective injunctions are very similar to the rationales relied upon by
federal courts in refusing to prospectively enforce a prior arbitration
award. 144 The lack of specificity of a prospective injunction as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) is very similar to the requirement by
most federal circuits that there be a specific degree of factual similarity
between a prior arbitration award and a current dispute. Stated differently,
if an injunctive order does not specifically state what type of activity is
prohibited, the order cannot be enforced. Similarly, if a prior arbitration
award is not strictly factually identical, or least substantially similar, then
prospective enforcement is not warranted.
Second, a prospective injunction will not be issued when the employer
fails to show irreparable injury due to a specific pattern of strikes. In the
prospective enforcement context, successful prospective enforcement claims
are usually denied unless there is evidence of a pattern of grievances
alleging violations of the same contract provision or a series of arbitration
awards that adjudicate similar disputes in favor of the union. 145
Third, prospective injunctions will not be issued when there is a strong
policy interest in preserving adjudication of prohibited strike activity on a
case-by-case basis. In citing the Steelworkers' Trilogy, numerous courts
adjudicating prospective enforcement claims have stated that arbitration of
individual grievances is the preferred method for labor dispute resolution. 146
Fourth, an order for a prospective injunction will not be enforced when
the order is vague, overbroad, and oversteps the boundaries of a Boys
142 522 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975).
143 Id. at 1228.
144 See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1054
(5th Cir. 1981).
145 See supra cases cited note 1.
146 See supra text accompanying note 4.
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Markets injunction. Unlike prospective injunctions, prospectively enforced
arbitration awards have never been analyzed within the Boys Markets
framework. The remainder of this Article is devoted to such analysis.
B. Prospective Enforcement and the Boys Markets Threshold Test
As stated at the outset of this Article, there are two major problems
with suits for prospective enforcement. First, prospective enforcement tests
devised in the federal courts do not provide adequate standards for judicial
review. Each test is ambiguous and requires some degree of interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement.
Second, the federal courts have not articulated those circumstances in
which prospective enforcement of a prior arbitration award is warranted. By
the court's failure to state when prospective enforcement is an appropriate
remedy, unions undoubtedly have chosen not to pursue prospective
enforcement of an arbitration award when this remedy may have been
warranted. It is a plausible argument that fewer Boys Markets injunctions
would have been issued if more arbitration awards had been prospectively
enforced.
For these reasons, the Boys Markets threshold test and the subsequent
criteria established by courts issuing prospective injunctions can provide the
framework for upholding enforcement claims.
In any suit in which the employer seeks injunctive relief, the reviewing
court should first determine whether an injunctive order meets the following
requirements: (1) the strike is over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate; (2) the company demanded that the dispute
be submitted to arbitration; (3) the collective bargaining agreement contains
a no-strike clause; and (4) the issuance for the injunction is necessary to
prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff and such injury is greater than any
hardship to the defendant. 147
These requirements are merely a threshold test to determine whether or
not an injunction should be issued when a union has gone on strike despite a
no-strike provision in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. After
meeting the threshold test, the question remains as to whether a prospective
injunction order should be issued despite the Supreme Court's policy of
supporting arbitration as the favored method of labor dispute resolution.
In the prospective injunction situation, the courts have relied upon the
following criteria: (1) the number of illegal work stoppages in the past;
(2) the pattern of illegal work stoppages in the past; (3) the union's
proclivity to strike; and (4) the possibility of similar strikes in the future.
The Boys Markets threshold test and the criteria developed for
147 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254.
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prospective injunctions are easily adaptable to claims for prospective
enforcement of arbitration awards. A reviewing court should first determine
whether the union can establish a colorable claim that prospective
enforcement of a prior arbitration award is warranted. In this manner the
court will meet the threshold test of the Boys Markets injunction. 148 Upon
determining that such a claim exists, the reviewing court should then utilize
the prospective injunction criteria in determining whether prospective
enforcement is warranted.
By using this analysis, the federal court is not only able to employ a
uniform federal standard, but may also apply the various fact similarity tests
adopted in that court's particular federal judicial circuit. The fact similarity
tests then become a single rather than a sole criterion used in determining
whether a prior arbitration award should be prospectively enforced.
Thus, in a suit for prospective enforcement, the first requirement of the
threshold test is whether the prior arbitration award and subsequent
grievance, if any, are those which the parties are contractually bound to
arbitrate. This first requirement is identical to the first criterion of the Boys
Markets test. 149 The degree of factual similarity of the prior arbitration
award and subsequent violations should not be an issue. The reviewing
court need only determine that the current dispute and prior arbitration
award are covered by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
The second requirement in the prospective enforcement claim is that the
prior award was submitted to arbitration, and subsequent grievances
regarding the same contract violation were timely filed. Alternatively, if the
prior arbitration award was issued prospectively, the reviewing court need
not make this determination because the arbitration process was already
utilized.
This second requirement corresponds with the second criterion in a
Boys Markets injunction: the company demands that the dispute be
submitted to arbitration. 150 The underlying purpose in either case is to
ensure that the parties have attempted to resolve their dispute through
arbitration rather than seek judicial resolution.
The third requirement for prospective enforcement is that an arbitration
clause should exist in the collective bargaining agreement. The Boys
Markets requirement that a no-strike clause exist is largely a factual
determination. 15 1 A requirement for an arbitration clause would fulfill the
same purpose in the prospective enforcement context.
The fourth requirement is prospective enforcement of an arbitration
148 See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254. See also supra text accompanying note 92.
149 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254.
1501Id.
151 See id.
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award that prevents irreparable injury to the plaintiff. Such injury must be
greater than any hardship to the defendant. This requirement is substantially
identical to the Boys Markets requirement and serves several purposes. 152
By requiring that the union suffer irreparable injury, the courts are
protected from a flood of claims for prospective enforcement of arbitration
awards. Irreparable injury in the prospective enforcement context would not
include sporadic or unrelated violations of the collective bargaining
agreement, nor would irreparable injury include those instances in which
the employer can articulate a good faith basis for violating the contract.
Further, the "irreparable injury" terminology should be interpreted as
one factor indicative of a hostile labor relationship. To successfully bring
suit for prospective enforcement of a prior arbitration award, the union
should be required to show that the employer willfully and pervasively
violated a collective bargaining agreement in contradiction to the prior
award.
In prospective injunction cases, evidence of financial hardship suffered
by the employer is usually sufficient to prove irreparable injury. Similarly,
the union should be required by the court to show that re-arbitration of
those grievances similar to the prior award would create a severe financial
hardship for the union.
If a federal court determines that the union meets the prospective
enforcement threshold test as adopted from Boys Markets, and thus can at
least bring a prospective enforcement claim, then the court should also
require that the union meet the prospective injunction criteria, as modified
below, before holding that a prior arbitration award should be given a
prospective effect.
C. The Application of Prospective Injunction Criteria to Prospective
Enforcement Suits
First, the federal court should consider the number of employer
violations of the prior arbitration award. This requirement corresponds with
the prospective injunction inquiry of the number of illegal work stoppages
in the past. The union need only show that there was a sufficient number of
grievances or prior arbitration awards that were violated after the prior
arbitration award was issued. This is largely an evidentiary issue for the
court.
The second prospective injunction requirement is that the illegal work
stoppages or prohibited strikes, or both, have a similar basis in fact.
Similarly, the second requirement in the prospective enforcement context is
that the employer must commit a pattern of violations of the prior
152 See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254.
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arbitration award. Under this requirement, the various fact similarity tests
adopted in each federal circuit gain significance. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit can require "positive assurance" that the previous contract
violations are factually similar. The Fifth Circuit can also require "material
factual identity" of prior violations. Although the ambiguity of these
phrases is not lost, the threshold test and the remaining prospective
requirements reduce their subjectivity. Moreover, by including the term
"pattern," the court need not interpret the collective bargaining agreement
in order to discern whether the employer's subsequent actions violated the
collective bargaining agreement. "Pattern" in this context should only mean
transactional similarity.
The third criterion in the prospective injunction test is whether the
union has demonstrated a proclivity to strike. In a prospective enforcement
case, the union must show that the employer has demonstrated a proclivity
to willfully and pervasively violate the prior arbitration award. As stated by
the Supreme Court in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Org.,153 "one would hardly expect an employer to continue in
effect an employment practice that routinely results in adverse arbitral
decision." 154 Thus, not only should the court review the prior conduct of
the employer, the union should also be required to prove that the employer
has repeatedly violated the contract despite the existence of the prior
arbitration award. Under this requirement, the court's decision is much
more fact-specific. The court is obligated to examine not only the prior
arbitration award but also the parties' labor relationship. Consequently, this
requirement eliminates much of the ambiguity and subjectivity of the
various prospective enforcement tests currently in existence.
In addition, this requirement eliminates the potential retaliatory claims
brought by unions against employers. For example, it is foreseeable that a
union may file an unfounded prospective enforcement suit against an
employer in order to gain increased bargaining power during negotiations.
The fact that the union must prove, or the court must find, the employer's
proclivity to willfully and pervasively violate the collective bargaining
agreement will eliminate many union claims brought in bad faith.
The fourth and final requirement also eliminates many bad faith claims
in that the court must examine the likelihood of the employer violating the
prior award in the future. This requirement is similar to the prospective
injunction requirement that the court must examine the possibility of strikes
in the future.
The most important function of this requirement is that it allows the
153 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
154 d. at 67.
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federal courts to remand the subsequent contract violations to arbitration if
violations appear to be unlikely in the future. Because of the Supreme
Court's holding in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills155 that arbitration is the
favored method of labor dispute resolution, the federal courts have been
constrained to uphold this policy and limit the scope of judicial review. This
fourth requirement allows the courts to continue the Supreme Court's
federal labor policy and still entertain suits for prospective enforcement. For
example, a federal court may find that the parties have more to gain by
deferring the subsequent violations to arbitration than allowing the parties to
become embroiled in litigation. Alternatively, the court may find that even
though the union's claim is not sufficient to support a suit for prospective
enforcement, arbitration would be beneficial. In short, the court may find
that arbitration is preferable to a suit for prospective enforcement because
the latter will only provide the union and employer with "something more
to argue about."
In summary, the prospective enforcement model can be shown as a two
prong test. The first prong is the threshold test which requires the
following: (1) the prior arbitration award and subsequent grievances are
those that the parties are contractually bound to arbitrate; (2) the prior
award was submitted to arbitration, and subsequent grievances, or
arbitration decisions, were timely filed; (3) an arbitration clause exists in
the current collective bargaining agreement; and (4) prospective
enforcement of a prior arbitration award is necessary to prevent irreparable
injury to the union and such injury is greater than any hardship to the
employer.
Assuming a union can meet the threshold test, the reviewing court
would then invoke the prospective enforcement criteria as adapted from
various federal cases upholding a prospective injunction. These criteria are:
(1) there have been several employer violations of the prior arbitration
award in the past; (2) such violations constitute a similar pattern with a
similar basis in fact; (3) the employer has demonstrated a proclivity to
willfully and pervasively violate the prior award; and (4) the employer is
likely to violate the prior award in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The prospective enforcement test articulated in this Article is easily
applicable to every prospective enforcement suit. It is more precise and less
subjective than the prospective enforcement tests previously developed in
the federal circuits.
By drawing heavily from Boys Markets, the prospective enforcement
155 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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test emphasizes the historical relationship between the parties rather than the
degree of fact similarity between an arbitration award and a current dispute.
Consequently, the prospective enforcement test does not offend federal
labor policy because it minimizes, if not eliminates, a surreptitious judicial
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
The effectiveness of prospective enforcement as a remedy is largely
dictated by its use. Prospective enforcement of a prior arbitration award
should be employed in limited contexts, such as when an employer violates
a collective bargaining agreement in bad faith. Prospective enforcement thus
becomes a counterbalance to prospective injunctions, and the arsenal of
labor relations weaponry is more evenly dispersed between the employer
and the union.
Moreover, prospective enforcement vindicates prospective injunctions,
in those circuits reluctant to issue them, while at the same time limiting the
likelihood of their use. A union will not be compelled to strike in violation
of a collective bargaining agreement if it is possible to prospectively enforce
a prior arbitration award.
As developed in this Article, the greatest benefit of the prospective
enforcement test is in the context of its use and as a counterbalancing
remedy. Rather than viewed as an aberration of the "garden variety" suit
for judicial review, prospective enforcement can and should be seen as a
powerful means of furthering labor relations and minimizing industrial
strife.

